From his first attempts to explain attachment phenomena in the 1940s through his Attachment and Loss trilogy (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 (Bowlby, , 1973 (Bowlby, , 1980 , John Bowlby reformulated the theoretical underpinnings of attachment theory several times. He initially attempted to explain attachment phenomena in psychoanalytic terms. Then he invoked ethological theory in the explanation of how and why people behave as they do in close personal relationships. The mature theoretical framework that he presented between 1969 and 1982 in the attachment and loss trilogy retained strengths and insights, ultimately situating them within an overarching control systems framework. This article describes key stages in Bowlby's theoretical development, with particular emphasis placed on the emergence of control systems theory as a cornerstone of the mature theory. It also compares Bowlby's control systems approach to contemporary cognitive science approaches. It concludes by suggesting how Bowlby's control systems formulation could evolve along the path opened up by contemporary work in computational modeling and how it could benefit by doing so.
This article is an analysis of how John Bowlby developed the "attachment control system" concept. Bowlby's use of the concept originated as an attempt to explain a complex cluster of behavioral and psychological phenomena related to attachment relationships, without invoking explanations in terms of psychoanalytic constructs. Bowlby's approach assimilated an armory of modeling techniques from cybernetics, artificial intelligence (AI), and other scientific approaches to explaining these phenomena. In doing so, he employed both emerging cognitive theories and introduced concepts and explanations which were ahead of his time. Indeed, many of his explanations have a very contemporary cognitive science "feel" (Petters, 2016) . However, he faced one critical obstacle in presenting cognitive science complexity as a substitute for psychoanalytic complexity; namely, that cognitive science was in its infancy. At the time, few models spoke directly to the kinds of psychoanalytic processes he wanted to redescribe in cognitive terms.
Bowlby described his foray from psychoanalytic theory into ethology, and then into a variety of research areas concerned with human information processing, as an attempt to provide a scientifically respectable foundation for attachment theory (Bowlby, 1981) . A conceptual analysis of the development of attachment theory provides useful insights into Bowlby's strategy, and into the convergence of his ideas with the undertaking we recognize today as cognitive science. Bowlby (1969 Bowlby ( /1982 viewed his control systems framework as an initial explanatory model to be extended and deepened, and ultimately integrated with scientific explanations at other levels of abstraction. Recent neuroimaging results presented by Bretherton and Munholland (2016) support this approach. However, because the information processing models with which Bowlby illustrates his attachment explanations are relatively simple, it can seem that he was presenting these ideas as a metaphor that could be invoked to differentiate attachment theory from psychoanalysis, and then be safely ignored (Bretherton, 1985, pp. 12-13; Bretherton, 1999, p. 1; Bretherton & Munholland, 2016, p. 63 and p. 68; Hinde, 1991, p. 378 and 397) . A key contribution of this article is to show that the control system concepts Bowlby employed can be more than mere metaphors. Using contemporary cognitive science modeling, it is now possible to implement the kind of empirically accessible, information-based attachment theory that Bowlby anticipated but found just beyond his reach. addition, the target for theoretical explanation was initially broader and then focusing strategically on the mother-infant relationship. During attachment theory's long theoretical development, Bowlby imported ideas from diverse disciplines to explain phenomena related to social and emotional attachments in close relationships (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991; Bowlby, 1969 Bowlby, /1982 Bretherton, 1992; Holmes, 1993) . He adopted new concepts to substitute for psychoanalytic constructs which he wanted to transform. Surveying the range of concepts Bowlby introduced over time, we can see he was influenced by dramatic changes in the intellectual milieu between 1950 and 1980. Explanatory concepts which were newly prominent had a particularly strong influence as Bowlby formulated elements of attachment theory at those times. The development of attachment theory during this period falls into three phases: (1) Bowlby's initial thinking in the late 1940s and early 1950s had a heavy psychoanalytic influence (Bowlby, 1956) ; (2) introducing concepts from ethology (Bowlby, 1958 (Bowlby, , 1960d ; and (3) from cybernetics and AI (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 (Bowlby, , 1973 and ultimately integrating with cognitive psychology (Bowlby, 1980) .
Before Attachment Theory: A Psychoanalytic Theory
Bowlby became interested in personality development and the key role played by an individual's early caregiving environment before he trained as a psychoanalyst (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991, p. 333) . His belief in the significance of real-life events on the course of child development set him in conflict with several psychoanalysts with whom he worked at the Tavistock Clinic in the late 1940s, resulting in his forming his own research unit in 1948 (Bretherton, 1992) . At an early stage of his research career he chose to focus on the effects of early separation from the mother rather than other examples of disturbed family interaction. Bowlby made this decision due to practical considerations, as he intended to work within a scientific methodology which focused on analyzing the effect of environmental conditions. This was in contrast to adopting the retrospective case study conducted by other psychoanalysts. From Bowlby's view, separation events were particularly suitable for research as they were an event on record, whereas at that time there was no adequate reporting or documentation for other forms of disturbed family interaction (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991, p. 334 ).
Bowlby's departure from the mainstream of psychoanalysis was also due to his awareness of problems with Freud's motivational theory. For Bowlby, this approach to motivation required revision because it was rooted in a drive theory which suggested infants were primarily focused on their inner drives and drive representations, and little interested in the social or physical environment per se (Waters, Kondo-Ikemura, Posada, & Richters, 1991) . This focus inward was in part driven by the psychoanalytic retrospective case study method which Bowlby had rejected (van der Horst, 2011) . Critiques from psychology and philosophy of science also made clear that the drive theory of motivation was not tenable. It was not well supported by their own evidence, which itself was problematic, and seemed inaccessible to ordinary standards of empirical analysis and falsification (Bowlby, 1981) .
In 1951 Bowlby published a landmark report to the World Health Organization which contained a substantial body of observations on the mental health of children (Bowlby, 1951) . Although this report was principally a survey of empirical work, it also illustrates the manner in which Bowlby was attempting to reshape psychoanalytic theory. Bretherton (Bretherton, 1992) notes that: "It is interesting to examine the 1951 report from today's perspective. At that time Bowlby still used the terminology of traditional psychoanalysis (love object, libidinal ties, ego, and superego), but his ideas were little short of heretical" (Bretherton, 1992, p. 50 ).
Bowlby's unorthodoxy is highlighted by Bretherton (Bretherton, 1992 , p. 51):
[The mother] is his ego and his superego. Gradually he learns these arts himself, and as he does, the skilled parent transfers the roles to him. This is a slow, subtle and continuous process, beginning when he first learns to walk and feed himself, and not ending completely until maturity is reached. (Bowlby, 1951 , p. 53, quoted in Bretherton, 1992 According to Bretherton, this description: "sounds more Vygotskian than Freudian" (Bretherton, 1992, p. 51) . Why did Bowlby attempt a transformation of psychoanalytic terms like ego and superego rather than just rejecting all of the psychoanalytic framework outright? Psychoanalysis did possess a number of key insights into early experiences and relationships which Bowlby valued and wanted to maintain in his own approach (Waters et al., 1991) . These insights include that human infants have a complex cognitive and emotional life; attachment cannot be equated with the amount of overt behavior toward attachment figures or with the amount or duration of protest that follows separation; and early attachment relationships are prototypes of later love relationships (Waters et al., 1991) . He therefore wanted to reform psychoanalytic theory not replace it wholesale. However, Bowlby, keenly aware of the sociology of science, recognized that critics would likely throw out the genuine insights along with the untenable motivation theory. He also recognized that the useful insights about early experience and relationships were logically independent of the drive theory. Central then to his work on attachment theory at this stage was to find an alternative approach to motivation. The key here was to avoid replacing one kind of magic (drives) with another (e.g., the infant intends, signals, wants, needs, loves, etc. the mother) thereby incurring what Dennett (1981) calls "intelligence loans," presumptions of intelligence that are unlikely to be accounted for ("paid back; " Richardson, Shockley, Fajen, Riley, & Turvey, 2010) . As we shall see, first in ethology, and later in cybernetics and AI, Bowlby found approaches that could account for what he called "the apparently purposeful" organization of observable attachment behavior without incurring such intelligence debts.
As Ainsworth and Bowlby (1991) recount, it was in the early 1950s that: Bowlby [. . .] had begun a search for adequate explanation of the empirical findings, having found none in current psychoanalytic theories to account for young children's responses to separation and reunion, or indeed how the tie to the mother develops. At this point Konrad Lorenz's work on imprinting became available in translation. Sensing its possible relevance to his problem and encouraged by Julian Huxley, Bowlby began delving into the ethological literature. (Ainsworth & Bowlby, 1991, p. 337) Though the first scientific approach that Bowlby drew upon was ethology, Bowlby's revision of psychoanalytic theory with an ethological perspective occurred gradually. The transitional nature This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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of Bowlby's theoretical perspective at this time is illustrated by Bowlby himself in 1953, when he stated:
I want to remark on three or four psychological processes which may be relevant, and in doing so I shall speak in a hybrid, bastard language which I have come to use, which derives from both psychoanalysis and ethology. (Bowlby, 1956, pp. 183-184) This shows Bowlby did not experience an overnight conversion from a psychoanalytic view to the scientific view provided by the then nascent disciplines of cybernetics, AI, and systems theory. However, we can see from the meetings he attended and the interactions he engaged in at these meetings that he was inexorably moved toward viewing attachment relations in scientifically respectable information processing terms. For example, the transcript of the second meeting of the World Health Organization Study Group on the Psychobiological Development of the Child in 1954, records Bowlby and Grey Walter discussing the scientific nature of the psychoanalytic superego' construct:
BOWLBY: The superego is rather complicated and contains more than one variable.
GREY WALTER: Can you measure the superego? BOWLBY: You cannot.
GREY WALTER: Then what is the point of discussing it?
BOWLBY: I think it is useful to try and see how things relate in these psychological functions after which we are dimly trying to grope (Grey Walter, 1956, p. 205 ).
To conclude, what Bowlby was trying to achieve by his departure from psychoanalysis was to explain attachment phenomena in a scientifically respectable manner without a wholesale rejection of the psychoanalytic perspective (Bowlby, 1981) . We might say that the psychoanalytic perspective acted as a kind of lens, because of the way Bowlby viewed phenomena through the filter and focus of his existing understanding, and a specification of requirements because a new scientifically respectable theory had a set of phenomena (important to psychoanalytic theory) which it must explain. In particular he wanted to explain aspects of the motherinfant relationship which were highlighted by the psychoanalytic approach. However, this was tricky because the kinds of psychological phenomena focused upon by psychoanalytic theorists are intimately related to the storehouse of theoretical mental structures and mechanisms invoked within this community.
Attachment Theory Proper: An Evolutionary Ethological Formulation
After Robert Hinde (a leading ethologist) joined the seminar group Bowlby established at the Tavistock Clinic in 1954, the incorporation of ethological theory in Bowlby's conceptual development deepened. This collaboration helped contribute to Bowlby's first formal statement of attachment theory in his 1958 article The Nature of the Child's Tie to his Mother (Bowlby, 1958) . This initial formulation was built upon three key postulates: (1) attachment behaviors are species-specific behavior patterns which he termed "instinctual responses;" (2) the infant's attachment is mediated by a set of simple behaviors which are part of our primate evolutionary endowment; and (3) with experience these behaviors become integrated into a more complex behavioral system with the predictable outcome of establishing and maintaining proximity to the mother (Bowlby, 1958, p. 366) . It is worth emphasizing that, although later theories provided more detail on how the attachment system develops, even this early theory presents attachment responses as constructed through interaction between infants and their caregiving environment. This was an important point because, for many, invoking evolution suggested that the attachment system was like a preformed blueprint waiting to be triggered or maturing without experience. This was not Bowlby's view at all.
Between 1958 and the 1969 publication of the first volume of the Attachment and Loss Trilogy, Bowlby published six articles that reflect significant advances in his thinking (Bowlby, 1960a (Bowlby, , 1960b (Bowlby, , 1960c (Bowlby, , 1960d (Bowlby, , 1961 (Bowlby, , 1963 . From these ethological/evolutionary insights, Bowlby crafted alternative explanations for several key psychoanalytic formulations. Bowlby showed how ideas from ethology could be used to explain the ontogeny of object relations and anxious, depressed, and defensive responses which are triggered by infant-mother separations (Bowlby, 1960d) . He considers the ethology inspired idea that attachment is a primary need which leads to the emergence of reciprocal social relationships during ontogeny. This theoretical innovation leads to the understanding that distress and anxiety are normal expectations when separations occur. While he still refers to many psychoanalytic constructs like "orality," "repression," and "symbolic substitutions" he does speculate whether behavior previously thought to arise from these mechanisms might be better described by ethological concepts. For example, where psychoanalysts would explain one activity taking the place of another because of symbolic equivalence, Bowlby describes how this may occur at an intrasymbolic level due to ethological displacement activities. Two articles give an overview of behavioral phases related to attachment and loss, linking separation anxiety to protest; grief and mourning to despair and depression; and detachment to defensive processes (Bowlby, 1960c (Bowlby, , 1961 . He makes the claim that these three types of response are phases of a single process, and each phase is best understood as part of the whole process. Bowlby claims that this insight was long to come to psychoanalysts such as Freud because they started with repression and "worked backward," rather than starting with loss and despair and then considering what might follow (Bowlby, 1960c) . Bowlby also discussed links between models of motivation and mourning in infancy and adulthood (Bowlby, 1960a (Bowlby, , 1960b (Bowlby, , 1963 . He was also clear in setting out the limitations of energy models of motivation. In arguing that an ethological framework is an improvement on psychoanalytic ideas he provided a great deal of detail on similarities between mourning in humans and in other animals. He went much further than the 1958 article in providing details of ethological mechanisms like the environmental triggers that activate behavior. He also reflects more deeply on theoretical foundations for this ethological model of attachment, with greater consideration of evolutionary functions related to phenomena such as the subjective painfulness of mourning, and why grief often involves anger and hatred.
Taken together these articles demonstrate Bowlby was creative in redescribing phenomena in ethological terms which had previously only been explained in psychoanalytic terms. It is noticeable how far he attempts to go with ethology as a substitute framework for psychoanalysis, in the depth and breadth of the phenomena he attempts to This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
reexplain. In these six articles Bowlby is presenting, in a scientific manner, the whole individual person, in his or her environment, and presenting them as possessing an ethological motivational system arrived at from an ontogenetic and evolutionary trajectory. However, no complex internal dynamics are presented in the approach set out in these six articles. When Bowlby does speculate on details of an internal architecture he either sticks with the simplicity of the ethological approach to architectural concerns, or he reverts back to a selective adaptation of Freudian ideas. Therefore, if Bowlby had stopped the development of attachment theory at the ethological stage the resulting framework would have lacked the complexity needed to explain the broad collection of cognitive and affective life span phenomena explained by the full control systems approach set out in his Attachment and Loss trilogy (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 (Bowlby, , 1973 (Bowlby, , 1980 . In summary, the ethological version of attachment theory was in several respects only part-way toward Bowlby's final characterization of attachment theory.
The "Full-Strength" Control System Formulation
Bowlby's final version of attachment theory, which was set-out across all three volumes of Bowlby's Attachment and Loss trilogy (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 (Bowlby, , 1973 (Bowlby, , 1980 , involves a richer and deeper conceptualization for attachment phenomena. Within a control system framework, Bowlby's three volume trilogy included information processing concepts such as homeostasis, hierarchical plans, internal working models (IWMs), selective attention, and metacognition. These concepts provide a coherent, integrated model for explanations of a range of attachment phenomena. Van der Horst (2011) described Bowlby's adoption of an ethological framework as an "Archimedean moment" (van der Horst, 2011, p. 3). However, the adoption of a cybernetic and control systems framework in the late 1960s has as much claim to be a core pivotal moment as the earlier adoption of ethology in the late 1950s.
Continuity and Change in Theoretical Developments
Bowlby reflected on the changing nature in his own theoretical approach during the 1960s, when he described the difference between his 1958 version of his theory and the version in the 1969 first volume of the Attachment and Loss trilogy:
The hypothesis proposed represents a development of that advanced by me in 1958. The principal change is due to better understanding of control theory and to recognition of the very sophisticated forms that behavioral systems controlling instinctive behavior may take. In the present version of the hypothesis it is postulated that, at some stage in the development of the behavioral system responsible for attachment, proximity to mother becomes a set-goal. In the earlier version of the theory five patterns of behavior-sucking, clinging, following, crying, and smiling-were described as contributing to attachment.
In the new version these same five patterns are still held to be of great importance, but it is postulated that between the ages of about nine and 18 months they usually become incorporated into far more sophisticated goal-corrected systems. These systems are so organized and activated that a child tends to be maintained in proximity to his mother. [. . .] The earlier version of the theory was described as a theory of component instinctual responses. The new version can be described as a control theory of attachment behavior. (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, / 1982 Bowlby's (1969 Bowlby's ( /1982 ) version of attachment theory shows the continued importance of secure base behavior with an increasing role for mental representation. As a control theory, the newer framework provides a greater focus on the attachment system as directed toward outcomes as set-goals to be achieved from a flexible behavioral repertoire rather than a system that simply involves triggering preset responses. However, the new theory still includes a strong ethological influence. Although the control systems formulation was a major departure from Bowlby's early instinct theory, he retained his commitment to behavioral biology (e.g., Bowlby still presents the attachment system as an instinct to form bonds and as a system that is activated by species specific patterns of care). In addition, Bowlby's new terminology of behavior systems only masks a core theoretical inheritance from his ethological instinct theory. As Hinde notes:
The concept of a behavioral system is, in fact related to one meaning of the term instinct. [. . .] It has been used in a rather special sense by ethologists to refer to systems postulated as controlling a group of behavior patterns that together serve to achieve a given biological end. (Hinde, 1983, p. 57) Even while Bowlby was providing an alternative to psychoanalytic explanations for attachment behavior, the range and type of phenomena of interest to psychoanalysts provided much of his research agenda:
The resulting conceptual framework is designed to accommodate all those phenomena to which Freud called attention; for example, love relations, separation, anxiety, mourning, defense, anger, guilt, depression, trauma, emotional detachment, sensitive periods in early life and so to offer an alternative of the traditional metapsychology of psychoanalysis. (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 Although Bowlby claimed that the trilogy sets out an approach which had already been fully conceived of at its initiation (E. Waters, personal communication, February 5th, 2013) , there were some limited changes in emphasis between the 1969 and 1980 publications. For example, the 1969 volume incorporated cybernetic and AI concepts and the 1973 and 1980 volumes show a switch in emphasis to cognitive psychology. This change is not surprising. Bowlby noted that both his, and Freud's previous formulations of instinctive behavior, were both "a reflection of the scientific climate of the times" (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 . Clearly, to incorporate up-to-date citations in the three volumes of his trilogy as he published them would involve inclusion of some influences from contemporary theoretical sources. However, how far Bowlby was influenced merely by the nature of the ideas in current circulation at any given time should not be over emphasized. During the 30 years in which he constructed attachment theory he selected particularly suitable concepts which matched his current requirements. So, he did incorporate concepts from the current literature, but from a wide set of candidate ideas he selected those which possessed the appropriate properties and fitted within his existing framework (e.g., in both the first and third volumes of the attachment trilogy psychoanalytic defensive processes are reframed in terms of how sensory inputs are processed). However, in the first volume this process is framed and referenced in terms of neurophysiological processes, in particular drawing upon the work of Magda Arnold (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 , whereas in the third volume the same attachment phenomena are This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
described in the newly fashionable cognitive psychological terms of selective attention (Bowlby, 1980, Chapter 4) .
The Architecture of Bowlby's Attachment Control System
In the first volume of his Attachment and Loss trilogy, Bowlby was continuing his search to consolidate the conceptual foundation for attachment theory by replacing Freud's concept of psychical energy and its discharge (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 . He introduced the attachment control system concept for this purpose. Bowlby presented ethological mechanisms operating within the attachment control system architecture as carrying out an action selection role. According to Bowlby, what defines the attachment control system is not a set behavior repertoire but the outcomes that predictably follow from these behaviors. Similar behaviors may be produced by different behavior systems. In the 1958 and later versions of attachment theory, the behaviors related to attachment were organized according to four behavior systems: the attachment, fear, sociability, and exploration systems. Where in the 1958 theory attachment instincts were linked to the activation of particular behaviors (which can be viewed as having an implicit goal in the sense of having a predictable outcome in environments similar to the species environment of evolutionary adaptedness), in the later final theory they were linked to the achievement of particular goals which are explicitly held as representations and which can be achieved by a variety of actions.
To illustrate the internal organization of the attachment control system, Bowlby set out a range of control systems of increasing sophistication. For a simple example of a control system, which acted as a regulator by keeping a single variable constant, Bowlby presented the humble thermostat. He noted that this system was relatively static (with a preset goal) and unable to act as a model of even the simplest form of instinctive behavior. However, he (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 showed how this control system design might be elaborated by allowing its goal setting to be determined by another control system. Such as servo mechanisms operating in a hierarchy. He also sketches out further extensions to this simple design of a greater sheer scale and complexity. In Bowlby's thinking the importance of the intimate integration of different representational forms is demonstrated when he noted:
The mental apparatus can be thought of as made up of a very large number of complex control systems, organized in a loosely hierarchical way and with an enormous network of two-way communications between them. At the top we postulate one or more principal evaluators and controllers, closely linked to long term memory and comprising a very large number of evaluation (appraisal) scales ranged in some order of precedence. This system, or possibly federation of systems, I shall call the Principal System(s), this leaving open the question whether it is best regarded as singular or plural. (Bowlby, 1980, p. 52) Though this passage is not a detailed description, it does direct research on attachment modeling to the exploration of how different constituent parts for an attachment control system might be organized and integrated. Updating Bowlby's conceptualization can therefore involve posing questions such as: What kinds of subsystems influence attachment behavior at different ages? How will different subsystems interact? How will the empirical finding of continuity in attachment patterns be supported as higher-level subsystems come "online?" Lastly, how might new subsystems be constructed?
One way to attempt to answer these questions is to design and implement running simulations of possible attachment models (Petters, 2004 (Petters, , 2006a (Petters, , 2006b Petters & Waters, 2015) . The field of attachment modeling is in its infancy but there are several examples of computational attachment models which simulate the action of the attachment control systems. Bischof (1975) presented a highly abstract simulation where the simulated infant agent and carer agent do not have complex internal states nor possess complex perceptual apparatus. They interact in a very simple two-dimensional (2D) virtual environment which possesses no other complex objects. The infant agent's social motivation is formalized as a cybernetic control system that is based upon the operation of attachment and exploration behavior systems. The infant agent's behavior switches between security seeking (moving toward the carer agent) or exploration (moving randomly), and the threshold for its behavior switching is moderated by a simple measure of familiarity which does not emerge from interaction with the environment but is manually switched between settings.
Petters (2006a) presents agent based models (ABMs) which are more complex than Bischof's in several ways. The infant and carer agents exist in 2D virtual environments in which they can move about and signal to each other with varying emotional valence. So infant agents model communications which vary from simulated smiling to crying. Infant and carer agents also sense the valence of the signals of other agents. A range of other objects that vary in size and functionality are included in the simulated environment. Toy objects have distinct perceivable attributes about which infant agents can learn. These attributes therefore allow infants agents to discriminate between toy objects they have already interacted ("played") with and those that remain unfamiliar and so novel. Infant agent can also become familiar with patterns of large objects, allowing them to distinguish "home" environments where they have interacted over many simulation cycles and a "strange situation" environment with unfamiliar objects and arrangement of objects (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) . Simulations can also include agents which represent unfamiliar adults, such as the friendly "stranger" who interacts with infants during the strange situation procedure (Ainsworth et al., 1978) .
In the ABMs described in Petters (2005) , the internal state of agents is also much more complex than the agents in Bischof's simulation. Infant agents possess behavior systems for exploration (of objects); social interaction (with other agents including their carer and a "stranger"); fear (of unfamiliarity over a wariness threshold); physical need (for close interaction and food); and attachment anxiety (being far from or out of sight of their carer agent) each of which generate and activate respective goals. Each of these goal generator-activators includes an opportunistic component, in that if an unfamiliar (therefore attractive) toy or social opportunity appears close to the infant this proximity gives rise to high temporary activation in the appropriate behavior system. In addition, goal activation for some goals has a drive like component (so any time period without exploration, social interaction, or contact with an attachment figure gives rise to a slight incremental increase in activation of the goal activation level for these goals).
As a simulation proceeds goal activation levels for exploration, social interaction, reducing wariness and reducing attachment anxiety goals rise and fall. Several action selection mechanisms have This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
been implemented to decide which goal is the one which sets external behavior of movement and signaling. A relatively simple mechanism implemented for action selection is a "winner take all" mechanism where the highest current activation controls what goals become active and directs motor and signaling behavior.
Computational experiments have been conducted with infant agents with this kind of control mechanism, where infant agents can learn how effective and sensitive their carer agent is in responding to their signals arising from social interaction and attachment anxiety goals. These experiments show different patterns of results are produced depending on whether infant agents learn about carer agent effectiveness from bids for all kinds of social interaction, or from just episodes of response to significant attachment anxiety-a theoretically important distinction (McDonald, 1992) . A more complex control system has also been implemented with dual loci of action selection control-with a winner take all action selection mechanism operating alongside a deliberative subsystem which can inhibit and redirect behavior after attempting to reason about what the likely outcome of actions directed by the winner-take-all mechanism will be. The deliberative subsystem of this more complex control system includes operators for strategy creation, strategy evaluation and selection, and strategy execution. Bischof's, and to a greater extent, Petters' simulations should be viewed as early attempts to explore a large design space of potential attachment control system designs. A key insight presented in this article is the similarity of these kind of attachment control system with contemporary cognitive architectures (Petters, 2006a, p. 143 ) suggesting a useful reconceptualization of the attachment control system as a "cognitive architecture for attachment." Because Bell and Newell (1971) didn't coin the term "cognitive architecture" until 1971 it is understandable that this term was not adopted by Bowlby when he originally formulated the attachment control system concept in 1969. However, from a contemporary vantage point, the match is clear. Newell (1990) defined a cognitive architecture as: "the fixed (or slowly varying) structure that forms the framework for the immediate processes of cognitive performance and learning" (Newell, 1990, p. 12) . So, Bowlby's conception of the attachment control system is certainly a cognitive architecture in this sense. The temporal structure of attachment patterns as long-term control states, and related shorter-term states in particular attachment related episodes, can be compared with other kinds of affective control states within cognitive architectures (Petters, 2006a; Sloman, 1993) . In addition, Anderson (2009) conceptualizes cognitive architectures from three perspectives: their function, the structures and mechanisms they possess, and the computations they perform. Bowlby set out all the three required ingredients for an architectural analysis of attachment phenomena, namely: empirically observed attachment behaviors, information processing structures and mechanisms, and an evolutionary functional analysis that matches these structures and mechanisms with observed behavioral patterns. For example, in the first volume of his Attachment and Loss trilogy, Bowlby did not just match behaviors of interest with potential information processing structures and mechanisms. He also spent a great deal of this first volume concerned with explicating the evolutionary function of attachment behaviors like proximity seeking.
A cognitive architecture does not need to be organized around just four kinds of motivation or goal (attachment, fear, sociability, and exploration). Instead, the architecture should be able to support the pursuit of a very large range of goals, and for a complex architecture, pursuing these goals through using various kinds of mechanism or structure. Bowlby presented reflexes, fixed action patterns, planning, and IWMs as mechanisms and structures involved in pursuit of all attachment related goals, from infants to adults. Future attachment modeling should update this collection of candidate structures and mechanisms and systematically explore the architectural design space of possible cognitive architectures for attachment.
Considering how a modern computational account can take attachment theory forward we can ask: What are the options a modeler might choose from in designing cognitive architectures? One way to classify different architectures is by the nature of the subsystems they possess. The next section presents the planning systems that Bowlby described as part of the attachment control system, with some consideration of what shape contemporary updates might take. The following section presents IWMs as a separate kind of component within the attachment control system, which would work alongside the planning system, and considers how this construct might be updated. However, how the components are arranged in a cognitive architecture is highly influential in determining the architecture's capabilities (Sloman, 1993; Wright, Sloman, & Beaudoin, 1996) . For example, Dayan and coworkers have formulated a Bayesian cognition framework, inspired by neuroscience and information theory, that explains how multiple subsystems (they term "controllers") carry out action selection (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Dayan, Niv, Seymour, & Daw, 2006; Dayan & Seymour, 2008; Lengyel & Dayan, 2008) . show how the different controllers of this framework are putative explanations for a range of attachment phenomena. What is critical about this framework when considering the organization of a cognitive architecture for attachment is that a coherent behavior pattern might be driven by more than one controller and the responses of the controllers are considered to be mediated by a decision principle based upon uncertainty (Daw et al., 2005; Dayan, 2008; Lengyel & Dayan, 2008) . Each of the controllers regulated by this decision procedure incorporates a measure of its own uncertainty in its likely performance. The least uncertain controller is then chosen to direct the next action. This Bayesian decision mechanism may account for the distinction between organized and disorganized behavior because when experiences are unpredictable no controller has enough certainty in its own performance to seize control and direct actions with coherence and consistency.
Hierarchical Planning
Planning involves considering "in the mind" the outcomes that are possible from taking sequences of available actions. While ethology is mainly concerned with how discrete actions are taken in response to actual immediate stimuli without much "lookahead," psychoanalysis has a lot to say about how people think reflect in detail on future outcomes. However, Bowlby's treatment of planning within the attachment control system framework is based far more strongly on the state search approach of AI planning than psychoanalytic phantasy. In the first volume of the Attachment and Loss trilogy, Bowlby also set out differences between control systems in terms of how the behaviors within them are organized. He presented behavioral chaining as an exThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
ample of a simple organizing principle for control systems, and hierarchical planning as much more complex and flexible (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 . In this approach, plans are composed of subplans, and each plan and subplan is a set of instructions for action. So, a high-level plan can give a main objective and general strategy, where subplans deal more with the details of how to implement actions. Bowlby presents a very broad range of planning types. He includes planning examples of both explicit human plans and planning carried out by rats and other animals (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, / 1982 . Although Bowlby presented contexts in which different kinds of plans would be formed, he did not distinguish these planning examples in terms of the sorts of representational or computational details needed to implement running simulations. We should expect modern computational accounts of planning in the attachment domain to situate planning subsystems within an overall computational architecture. Planning systems have been a mainstay of AI research from the 1960s to contemporary approaches that range from planning in robot navigation to planning systems which carry out complex industrial optimization tasks like scheduling the loading of container ships (Russell & Norvig, 2003) . A limitation of traditional AI planning approaches for the attachment domain is they involve considering plans as chains of discrete actions from a fixed repertoire bringing about transitions between discrete states of the world. Therefore such discrete plans do not take into account the continuous nature of relevant variables in close social interactions. Recently, researchers in cognitive science have also implemented systems which are more plausible models of planning in natural systems. For example, Cruse (2003) discusses a neural network model which can be used to control action, but also when minor changes are made the same network can be used to represent the self and environment and carry out planning of actions and outcomes of actions before actions are actually taken. This is an example of a motor system being retasked to become a forward model that might be used in planning. Bowlby (1969 Bowlby ( /1982 certainly considered forward models of this kind for inclusion in the attachment control system:
The settings to which the servo-units of an anti-aircraft gun are working can be derived from a radar instrument which is so designed that it tracks the aircraft, and not only tracks it but extrapolates from present knowledge of how the aircraft is moving to predict the aircraft's future position. In this way the gun is kept pointing constantly in such a way that a shot fired is likely to hit the aircraft. This type of system also is replicated in living organisms. There is reason to think that our possession of systems of this kind, appropriately linked and integrated, enables us to hit a moving tennis ball, and that similarly linked systems enable a falcon to seize a flying bird. Henceforward the objective of hitting the ball (or the aircraft) or seizing the bird is termed the set-goal of the system. (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 Grush (2004) provides a broader review of forward models, describing their wide use in diverse theories of human cognition. What all these models have in common is they all emulate the outcomes of actions using forward models of those actions without having to actually take those actions. Grush provides most illustrations for his emulation account from motor control but also outlines other cognitive functions that might be supported by the same forward model emulator mechanisms, including reasoning and theory of mind phenomena. What Cruse's network, Grush's emulators, and other contemporary approaches, such as predictive processing accounts (Clark, 2013) , have in common is an intimate connection between a planning mechanism (that allows an agent to "try out" actions before actually taking them), and representations of the self and environment that act as internal working models which support the deliberative planning mechanisms-which is precisely what Bowlby set out in the 1969 first volume of the Attachment and Loss trilogy (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 , albeit in less detail and without implemented simulations as examples.
Bowlby presents planning as a bounded cognitive process which is activated within a broader control system architecture. However, hierarchical plans can involve more abstract descriptors at higher levels. Such as descriptors related to the self. Therefore, following Neubauer's (2012) analysis, the products and processes involved in hierarchical planning can be invoked in self-emergence in a less bounded manner. So, from emulation of actions to higher level emergence of self, hierarchical attachment planning provides a potentially rich future research direction.
Internal Working Models
The concept of IWMs as important structures within the attachment control system was introduced in the first volume of the Attachment and Loss trilogy (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 . Bowlby was very clear about the conceptual heritage of this idea. Unlike his ideas on planning which were introduced directly from contemporary sources, the IWM concept was an attempt to make scientifically respectable previous ideas from psychoanalysis:
The environmental and organismic models described here as necessary parts of a sophisticated biological control system are, of course, none other than the "internal worlds" of traditional psychoanalytic theory seen in a new perspective. As in the traditional theory so in the theory advanced, much psychopathology is regarded as being due to models that are in greater or less degree inadequate or inaccurate. (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 In his attempt to draw this concept into scientifically oriented (and therefore evaluable) cognitive science, IWMs are described by Bowlby as higher-level representational forms which integrate and exert control over lower level control systems. Like psychoanalytic internal worlds, their principal information processing function in the mature theory is to allow predictions to be made about the likely outcomes of taking actions within a given environment.
In the first volume of the trilogy Bowlby emphasizes the requirements for IWMs to be updated. He invokes IWMs at early stages in development and later on, when linguistic skills and conscious reflection can enable models to become more adequate (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 . Bowlby also observes that pathological sequelae of separation and bereavement can be understood in terms of out of date models or half revised models which may contain inconsistencies and confusions (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 . Thus, linking to ideas from his three "mourning articles" in the early 1960s where he sets out a three-part process of separation anxiety, protest, and repression. In the mature version of attachment theory this idea is no longer described in the terms of psychoanalysis, and repression is instead reframed as "defensive exclusion" (Bowlby, 1980) . This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Bowlby linked the construction of plans with the operation of IWMs:
Not infrequently, many alternative plans are concocted, their potential consequences imagined (on the basis of models of environment and organism) and the consequences of each plan appraised. Only after that is any particular plan put into operation. (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 As with his presentation of planning, he does not emphasize the representational details for IWMs. This is because his audience at that time was researchers and clinicians in psychology and psychiatry-not researchers in artificial intelligence, robotics, or systems engineering. Petters (2016) presents a historical review of the development of the IWM concept in Bowlby's writing and shows the change over time from an analog to symbolic conception of IWMs between 1969 and 1982.
IWMs have been studied in a variety of contemporary simulations. In the agent based models of Petters (2006a) the total set of plans and evaluations of expected outcomes can be seen as a form of IWM. A contrasting way to model IWMs is shown in a number of recent studies using artificial neural networks (ANNs). These ANNs have been used to simulate, in a highly abstract fashion, how attachment representations may change or remain stable over development. Put simply, what the ANNs do is recognize patterns in the input information, and at later point those patterns can influence future "behavior" of the networks, in the sense of the outputs produced in particular contexts. A number of researchers have used Hopfield ANNs to simulate prototype formation (Edalat & Mancinelli, 2013; Smith, Stevens, & Caldwell, 1999) . Edalat and Mancinelli (2013) present a model that explains early attachment stability as arising from strong dynamic systems patterns. They demonstrate in Hopfield neural networks that simulations starting in a large number of initial conditions end up through multiple iterations in the same final attractor state (so possessing large basins of attraction). Demonstrating the interaction of empirical research and modeling, Fraley (2007) used an ANN to investigate earlier (Fraley, 2002) results from a meta-analysis on attachment stability. The ANN simulation demonstrated how early relationship prototypes can be formed and will respond to differing schedules of subsequent experience. A key conclusion from these artificial neural network simulations is that simulations can demonstrate that early prototypes are not overwritten, and so show greater continuity, when new relationship experiences are inconsistent. But consistent presentation of new prototypes does result in gradual change.
How might contemporary approaches in cognitive science move this work forward? While ANN models provide one possible way of updating Bowlby's IWM concept, this is just one possible direction from diverse options for future research. The work of Gibson (1986) and more recent sensorimotor approaches to action selection provides a contrasting way to conceive of IWMs for attachment (reviewed in Petters, 2016) . Gibson was primarily interested in explaining perception and argued that rather than the function of vision being concerned with gaining information about the properties of entities in the environment, it was better conceived as providing information about what actions are available to individuals-thus giving information about what positive and negative action affordances are available for the perceiver (Sloman, 2011) . We can adapt Gibson's notion of action affordances to the attachment domain: What positive and negative attachment affordances are available for an infant in a particular context? This work is related to existing research looking at how to learn social affordances in human robot interaction (Shu, Ryoo, & Zhu, 2016) . Attachment affordances are more abstract than the social affordances in this study but share with them being nonrepresentational or "representation-lite" action-focused conceptualization of IWMs. Viewing IWMs in this manner emphasizes that IWMs are not just memory stores but include links from what is perceived to options for actions.
The analysis of Lake, Ullman, Tenenbaum, and Gershman (2017) provides an alternative view to both the pattern recognition approach using ANNs to stand in for IWMs, and the attachment affordances approach. Lake et al. (2017) emphasizes the richness and flexibility of human learning and suggest that for human cognition, "model building is a better metaphor than learning as pattern recognition" (Lake et al. 2017, p. 38) . The basis of this view is that human learners operate in a fundamentally different way to today's ANNs, by using rich prior knowledge when engaging in new tasks. Humans are able to add knowledge to existing models because the models operate as general schemes and intuitive theories. Models can then be constituted as more than "passive" patterns in networks that only produce output as a direct result of new inputs, but structured procedures that generate new examples of concepts, which can even possess internal compositional structure. Lake et al.'s (2017) approach gets us closer to Bowlby's suggestion that IWMs transmit, store and manipulate information and allow the individual to "conduct small scale experiments within the head " (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 . In this contemporary view, an IWM is a world view, with internal "moving parts" of the kind that we can acquire implicitly over time or even explicitly wholesale in therapy.
Stability and Lability Over Ontogenetic Development
Bowlby didn't use the terms "precocial" and "altricial" to describe stable or labile control systems, but the developmental trade-offs he sketched for these contrasting systems match current conceptions in research on altricial and precocial patterns of development in contemporary computational cognitive modeling (Chappell & Sloman, 2007) . For example, Bowlby (1969 Bowlby ( /1982 ) presents a developmental trade-off whereby ontogenetic lability in a control system might result in a longer developmental duration but may also result in this control system becoming better adapted and more flexible than a stable fixed alternative. Recent work has framed similar ideas in terms of altricial and precocial forms of development, within artificial systems which might be used in computational modeling (Chappell & Sloman, 2007) . It is notable that this recent work has additionally linked altricial development (which corresponds to Bowlby's labile developmental pattern for control systems) with the development of higher level more explicit representational forms.
Representational Change Through Ontogenetic Development
According to Bowlby, each behavior system in the attachment control system has its own ontogenetic development, initially producing reflex actions and later in infancy producing fixed This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
action patterns which increase in the complexity of their organization in sequences and chains. Behavior systems related to the attachment system continue to develop through childhood and in adulthood we can use explicit models and natural language to deliberate on the attachment related consequences of our actions. However, according to Bowlby, earlier developing "behavior system" processes still exist and operate alongside more mature systems. Bowlby compared changes in the kinds of representations which infants and children would possess in their attachment control systems with representational forms such as sensorimotor, preconceptual, and symbolic representations which were theorized to occur in different Piagetian stages (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 . He also speculated that actions which are automatically triggered early in development, such as feeding reflexes, might then be organized into causal hierarchies which can then form part of plans with set-goals. (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 Petters & Waters, 2010, pp. 54 -55) . This appreciation of how representational forms can change early in infancy was matched by an acknowledgment of the important role played by language and symbolic forms of representation in later stages of development:
Thus, whereas during infancy and childhood humans are incapable of structuring their behavior in any way more complex than the simplest of plans, in adolescence and adulthood behavior is habitually structured on the basis of elaborate plan hierarchies. This tremendous development on the sophistication of the behavioral organizations employed is made possible, of course, by the increasing capacity of the growing human child to use symbols, especially language. (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 Bowlby recognized that natural language is the ultimate and most sophisticated way in which an individual can represent themselves within their social environment. This form of representation has the benefit that "instead of each one of us having to build his environmental and organismic models entirely for himself, he can draw on models built by others" (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 .
1 A benefit of noncommunicative aspect of language is the possession of language allows more flexible and imaginative plans to be created, and shared with others, with sharing with others constituting a possible form of therapy.
Significantly, Bowlby also recognized that the nature of early representations is intimately linked with later patterns of behavior, for example:
Man's capacity to use language and other symbols, his capacities to plan and build models, his capacities for long-lasting collaboration with others and for interminable strife, these make man what he is. All these processes have their origin during the first three years of life, and all, moreover, are from their earliest days enlisted in the organization of the attachment behavior. (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 Synthesis: Defensive Processes, Consciousness, and Therapy as Meta-Management
As with the conceptual development of IWMs, Bowlby's treatment of defensive processes shows a strong inheritance from his prior psychoanalytic views. In particular, he transformed ideas on repression into a concept of "defensive exclusion" which conserved aspects of the older idea but in a new scientifically respectable format that could be integrated with other contemporary cognitive science constructs.
In the final control systems version of this theory of defensive exclusion, he drew for inspiration upon material from the emerging field of cognitive psychology. He explained defensive processes in terms of multiple working models and differences in conscious access (Bowlby, 1973, p. 238) , selective attention (Bowlby, 1980, Chapter 4) , and explained recall, reflection, and potential internal conflict in self-image in terms of the distinction between episodic and semantic memory (Bowlby, 1980, pp. 61-64) .
In his 1973 account, some working models are open to conscious access. Some are unconscious but still highly influential, and so act as "a version in different terms, of Freud's hypothesis of a dynamic unconscious" (Bowlby, 1973, p. 238) . Bowlby also suggests IWMs can be formed with incompatible information, some of which becomes dominant and exerts influence either consciously or unconsciously:
In a person suffering from emotional disturbance it is common to find that the model that has the greatest influence is one that developed during his early years and is constructed on fairly primitive lines, but that the person himself may be relatively, or completely, unaware of; while simultaneously there is operating in him a second, and perhaps radically incompatible, model, that developed later, that is much more sophisticated, that the person is more nearly aware of and that he may mistakenly supposed to be dominant. (Bowlby, 1973, p. 238) Bowlby also linked the operation of information processing with conscious awareness:
Reflection suggests that many of the mental processes of which we are most keenly conscious are processes concerned with the building of models, with revising or extending them, checking them for internal consistency, or drawing on them for making a novel plan to reach a set-goal. Although it is certainly not necessary for all such processes always to be conscious, it is probably necessary that some should be so sometimes. In particular, it seems likely that revising, extending and checking of models are ill done or done not at all unless a model is subjected from time to time to whatever special benefits accrue from becoming conscious. (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, /1982 These quotes show that Bowlby's high-level framework can provide inspiration for contemporary computational models of defensive exclusion. However, although the problem has been analyzed no fully implemented simulations of defensive processes have yet been produced. Work toward simulations of defensive exclusion includes Petters and Coyne-Umfreville (2017) and Petters and Beaudoin (2017) discussing how the differences in selfknowledge demonstrated in dismissing and preoccupied behavior patterns in the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) might be modeled using contrasting frequency and decay memory recall func-1 This is a 1969 description which presages Dennett's (1996) description of Gregorian Minds. The similarity may not be coincidental. Dennett termed "Gregorian Minds" after Richard Gregory. The author of this article met Richard Gregory and in a subsequent e-mail exchange, in February 2010. Richard Gregory wrote: "I spent exactly one whole day with John Bowlby when he came to Bristol to visit me and we had a really great day. For most of the time we talked about what we were doing in the Brain and Perception laboratory in the Medical School but we did also talk about his work and I have spent quite a lot of time reading his papers and commenting on them. He did indeed have very wide interests and did think in terms of cybernetics and especially interacting machines. I must say I liked him very much indeed, and he certainly had a sharp and imaginative mind." This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
tions that control what memories become accessible during the AAI. Part of the challenge in simulating defensive processes is the link to consciousness. When considering how a modern computational approach can take these ideas forward it is worth noting Sloman's observation that current research on consciousness within cognitive science is "riddled with confusion and muddle" (Sloman, 2011, p. 2) . He suggests that this term is better replaced with precisely defined labels for special cases. For example, notions of accessibility or inaccessibility of self-knowledge might be captured in theories of consciousness which invoke something like a reflective or second-order or metamanagement processing layer in a cognitive architecture (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Minsky, 2006; Sloman & Chrisley, 2003; Petters, 2014b) . In this view, considering how an architecture might simulate having thoughts about thoughts is a way to investigate some kinds of self-reflection or metamanagement which are of interest to attachment researchers. Of particular pertinence to computational modeling, Bowlby describes how much of our habitual processing is automatic and portrays the kinds of reflective metaprocessing on mental life which occurs in therapy (at least when therapy is successful) in explicitly computational terms:
The psychological state may then be likened to that of a computer that, once programmed, produces its results automatically when activated. Provided the program is the one required, all is well. [When] representational models and programs are well adapted, the fact that they are drawn on automatically and without awareness is a great advantage. When however, they are not well adapted, for whatever reason, the disadvantages of the arrangement become serious.
For the task is of changing an overlearned program of action and/or of appraisal is enormously exacerbated when rules long implemented by the evaluative system forbid its being reviewed. [. . .] A psychological state of this kind in which a ban on reviewing models and action systems is effected outside awareness is one encountered frequently during psychotherapy. It indicates the existence of another stage of processing at which defensive exclusion can also take place, different to the stage at which perceptual defense takes place. (Bowlby, 1980, pp. 55-56) In this passage, what Bowlby is referring to when he discusses therapy as reviewing models are metaprocesses such as selfreflection and metamanagement (Sloman, 2011) . Research focusing on metamanagement and self-reflective capabilities operating alongside other action selection mechanisms in complex scenarios such as those found in the attachment domain remains an underexplored area of cognitive systems research (Vernon, 2014, p. 12) . Therefore, there is scope for progress in this area, and research can take inspiration from both the requirements set out by Bowlby's account and contemporary modeling approaches.
Cognitive modeling research on memory processes, such as memory accessibility in language use, is much more developed than research on self-reflection and metamanagement (Lewis & Vasishth, 2005) . However, Donald (2001) provides a analysis that shows the two approaches are related. This is because the differential accessibility of certain kinds of thoughts and memories, the expression of which is observed in attachment discourse like the AAI, may be investigated by looking at biases and selectivity in memory retrievals. As Hesse (2008) notes, the relatively fastpaced AAI protocol has the potential to "surprise the unconscious". Particular discourse patterns which reveal a particular kind of internal "state of mind" occur in part because of what is brought to mind from memory and what is not. Both Petters and Coyne-Umfreville (2017) and Petters and Beaudoin (2017) follow this line of exploration in their analysis of how modeling differential memory retrieval is a way to model defensive processes. Therefore, the current state-of-the-art in attachment modeling does not attempt to explain the first-person phenomenology of conscious self-awareness in the attachment domain. But existing approaches can attempt to explain the routes by which, for some, memories can form part of integrated and coherent narratives, while for others, certain memories do not reach self-awareness. So, explaining defensive processes in terms of ineffective access consciousness rather than in terms of phenomenal consciousness (Donald, 2001 ).
Models That Bridge Social and Neuroscience Levels
Attachment theory investigates a huge range of phenomenafrom the secure base behavior of 1-year-old infants in a public park (Anderson, 1972) to the linguistic narratives adults present about their own childhood experiences (Hesse, 2008) . So, attachment modeling also needs to capture meaning-making and attachment discourse, with models which support language and declarative memory. While some perceptual, motor, and affective phenomena of interest might be simulated at a low neuroscience abstraction level, this article argues taking a turn to neuroscience by modeling just at this level is not the way forward on its own. Ballard (2015) sets out a solution to the requirement for attachment models to bridge different levels of analysis. As Ballard notes, understanding the interaction of high-level functions like goal-based processing and intentional behavior, and low-level functions such as neural action will likely be more demanding and may even be intractable if the system is only analyzed at lower levels of abstraction. Such as looking at the behavior of individual neurons or low-level neural networks. He argues that because the brain has a hierarchical structure comparable with the hierarchical organizing principle of computation, layered structures in the brain can be compared with computational abstraction hierarchies. When models are posited at high abstraction levels, lower level details are initially suppressed but not ultimately ignored. On the contrary, as Ballard notes "by telescoping through different levels, we can parcellate the brain's enormous complexity into manageable levels" (Ballard, 2015, p. 18) . We can therefore integrate over abstraction levels for domains that require this, like attachment modeling. Having multilevel models can then aid evaluation by bringing to bear stronger empirical constraints because different abstraction levels will all constrain the model.
A benefit of this approach is models with intermediate psychological level constructs can link results from social psychology research on attachment with neuroscience results. This has not tended to occur. For example, while an early article by Hazan and Shaver (1994) launched a social psychology approach in attachment research and this article did invoke simple control systems diagrams, Crowell, Fraley, and Roisman (2016) note that on the whole, the study of adult attachment processes has not tended to emphasize the normative development aspects of the attachment system. Hence, the elucidation of the attachment control system in this work has not been central. Rather, according to Crowell et al. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
(2016), a social psychology approach in attachment research has mainly focused on individual differences in behavior and cognitions such as expectations. In addition, from the neuroscience perspective, Coan (2016, p. 243) argues that it is important to attempt to bridge currently disparate subfields-bringing together research on attachment as a neural construct and individual difference research on attachment. This article therefore makes a contribution by showing how to integrate lower-and higher-level approaches through combining both within broad architectural "control system" models.
Conclusion
Attachment theory originated from theories set out by Freud, and other psychoanalysts. However, Bowlby ultimately formed a clear distinction between attachment theory and psychoanalytic theory. He did this by explaining the richness, broad scope, and complexity of behavioral phenomena which interest psychoanalysts in information processing terms which are congruent with contemporary cognitive science constructs.
Updating attachment theory by engaging in attachment modelingthat is, using computers to simulate attachment phenomena-has all the benefits that computational modeling is generally found to have in the mostly cognitive psychology research fields in which it is predominantly undertaken (Dawson, 2004; Petters, 2014a) . A lot of clear thinking has to go into creating running simulations. For theories of psychological phenomena to be run on a computer requires precision and explicitness in description and a process of formalization which highlights possible logical flaws, inconsistencies, lacunae, hidden assumptions, or unexpected complexities about the processes being modeled in those theories. In addition to this welcome rigor, the overall process promotes serendipitous discoveries because running simulation can produce unforeseen behavior (Petters, 2004 (Petters, , 2006a (Petters, , 2006b Petters & Waters, 2015; Petters, Waters, & Schönbrodt, 2010) .
A number of specific benefits accrue from reviewing and updating the information processing foundations of attachment theory. The first is that attachment theory, with its contemporary multifaceted and diverse nature, can be better integrated as a research field. The potential integrative benefits of attachment modeling are underscored by looking at how models can bring together elements from the great diversity of approaches in contemporary attachment theory. A single model can include interacting agents that represent infants, caregivers, and strangers, so enabling the strange situation procedure to be simulated (Petters, 2006b; Petters & Waters, 2015) . The caregiver software agents that are used to model strange situation studies can also be used in simulations of the Adult Attachment Interview (Petters & Beaudoin, 2017; Petters & Coyne-Umfreville, 2017) . Having such diverse types of empirical data, from the many empirical attachment measures now used as well as the many perspectives that attachment research now follows, allow attachment model evaluation and validation by constraining models to simulate such a broad specification of requirements (Petters, 2004 (Petters, , 2006a .
Fonagy suggests attachment theory can seem "method-bound" because of the strong focus on a set of validated measures:
[Attachment theory's] scope was determined less by what fell within the domain defined by relationship phenomena involving a caretaking-dependent dyad and more by the range of groups and behaviors to which the preferred mode of observation, the strange situation, the adult attachment interview, and so forth, could be productively applied. (Fonagy, 1999, pp. 472-473) While Fonagy's remedy for the method-bound nature of attachment theory is to suggest that attachment theory researchers engage with the clinical discoveries of psychoanalysts, attachment modeling can provide a different route out of what Fonagy perceives is a method-bound domain. Attachment models can produce new predictions for existing measures and can simulate behavior in contexts not covered by current measures or observations. So, while this article has presented a diverse range of contemporary models as updates for elements of Bowlby's framework, future work can be even broader in scope and ambition.
To sum up, while contemporary attachment theory is diverse and multifaceted with many varied perspectives, most of these perspectives involve collecting new kinds of empirical data, not new underlying information processing explanations for attachment theory. Computational modeling that "telescopes" across abstraction levels (Ballard, 2015) can help update Bowlby's conception of the attachment control system. While modeling can contribute to attachment theory, the benefit is two-way. There is significant value in the rich, deep, broad, and complex modeling scenarios that the attachment domain provides for computational modelers.
